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Development of naval warfare tactics in the Anglo-Dutch Wars 
(1652-1674) 
Z S O L T P A L O T Á S 
UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED 
This essay aims to present the development and changes of naval warfare tactics during 
the Anglo-Dutch Wars in the seventeenth century (1652-1674). The main purpose of the 
study is source presentation and analysis. I would like to present the tactical changes in 
naval warfare using the contemporary Fighting Instuctions, which was edited and annotated 
by Julian Corbett. My goal originally was a translation and presentation of the source in 
Hungarian and through the source to introduce this section of modern history to Hungarian 
research. In this paper I am trying to explore how the issued instructions were put in to 
practice on the battlefield and how they influenced the development of naval warfare. The 
study's objective is not an in-depth analysis of the Anglo-Dutch Wars. It is to describe the 
most important events. During my research I came to the conclusion that the Hungarian 
literature does not examine the Fighting Instructions. I think it is important to write such a 
summary. That is why I chose that approach. We can say that the new maritime warfare 
which was applied in the Anglo-Dutch Wars had epochal importance. 
My presentation is based on English sources. The English and the Dutch researchers 
wrote several important monographs about the wars. For example: We have a number of 
primary sources about the wars and the naval warfare tactics. Corbett's work, Fighting 
Instructions, 1530-1816 (1905) was one my primary sources. Corbett formulated what has 
become the most influential theory of naval grand strategy. Samuel Pepys was the greatest 
naval administrator of the period and his diary is very important. It was issued relatively 
early: H. B. Wheatley: The Diary of Samuel Pepys (10 vols., 1893-1899). An early work 
about the tactics was written by Paul Hoste: L'art des armées navales (1697). There are 
several contemporary accounts of the battles. Guiche, a French Count participated in 
numerous battles. He wrote his memories: Memories d'Armand de Gramont, Comte de 
Guiche... (1744). We can also mention Penn's work: Granville Penn: Memorials of the 
Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn...: From 1644 to 1670 (Volume II. 1833). 
An early analysis of the Wars' reasons can be found in George Edmundson's work, 
Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century} Charles Wilson's 
work, Profit and Power: England and the Dutch Wars was more substantial.2 Some 
historians say that the war broke out because of commercial reasons. Jonathan Israel's 
1 George Edmundson: Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1911. 
2 Charles Wilson: Profit and Power. England and the Dutch Wars. Longmans, Green, London 1957. 
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work, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (1995) is a detailed 
history of the Dutch Republic. He presents the reasons and also the history of the Anglo-
Dutch Wars. Maarten R. Prak's work, Gouden Eeuw (2004) is also a summary work (I used 
the Hungarian translation). Steven C. A. Pincus's work, Protestantism and Patriotism 
(1990) claims that ideology and religion played important roles in the conflict. 
There are several old monographies. For example: John Leyland: The Royal navy 
(1914), Williams Hamilton: Britain's naval power (1894). Several studies present the 
opposing fleets. Jaap Bruijn's work, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries (1993) claims that the Dutch developed the first "standing navy" in the world. 
Roger Hainsworth's work, The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 1652-1674 recounts the wars in 
a narrative history.3 
A. T. Mahan work's, The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783 (1890) is the 
best book for placing the naval events in the context of general history. Sir William 
Clowes's work, The Royal Navy (1897) is useful in describing the events, but lacks 
references to authorities. J. R. Jones's work, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth 
Century (1996) is also important. Jack Sweetman's edited work, The Great Admirals 
(1997) is also a useful source (I used the Hungarian translation). Gijs Rommelse's work, 
Τ he Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) (2006) presents the events of the second war. 
The most extensive book about the Four Days' Battle is Frank L. Fox's work, A Distant 
Storm (1996). P. G. Rogers' work, The Dutch in the Medway (1970) introduces the Dutch 
attack in the Medway. 
The English Monarchy and the Dutch Republic fought three wars during the 17th 
century. The first between 1652-1654, the second between 1665-1667 and the third 
between 1672-1674. There was one more war during the 18th century: 1780-1784. The 
Dutch fell and the English rose. The wars were primarily naval and commercial wars. The 
most important thing was that modern naval tactics developed. Instead of the 16th century's 
chaotic sea battles, the 17-18th century was characterized - similarly to the land battles - by 
well-organized and predetermined battles. The good organization and the order was due to 
the different permanent fighting instructions.4 
The basis of English naval tactics during the 17-18th century was "The Fighting 
Instructions" first consolidated by James, Duke of York (later James II; ruled 1685-1688) 
in the 1660s. The constant instructions of battle were differently named over the years. In 
the Third War the Duke of York was commander at sea. In the spring of 1672 he distributed 
his fighting instructions. Later he released the first printed book containing both sailing and 
fighting instructions. These Instructions for better ordering his majesty's fleet in fighting1 
remained in general use until 1688. In 1689 the English government replaced this and 
published his own fighting instructions entitled Sailing and Fighting Instructions.6 
3 Roger Hainsworth - Christine Churches: The Anglo-Dutch naval wars 1652-1674. Alan Sutton 
Publishing, Ltd. Stroud, Gloucestershire 1998. 
4 Julian S. Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816. In: Publications of the Navy Records Society 
Vol. XXIX. (Publisher location unknown) 1905. 67-135. 
5 Ibid. 125. 
6 Jack Sweetman (ed.): Admirálisok: a történelem legkiválóbb tengernagyai 1587-1945. [The great 
admirals: command at sea, 1587-1954]. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest 1999. 21-22. 
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In the 17-18л century there were two 'schools' which presented the evolution of fleet 
tactics. One shool represented by the Duke of York and William Penn (1621-1670)7 
inclined to formality. This school was called the formalists. The other school represented by 
George Monck (1608-1670) and Prince Rupert (1619-1682) was inclined to take tactical 
risks. This school was called the meleeists. Both tactical opinions held the line of battle to 
be the proper formation for a fleet entering action. The formalists thought that the formation 
should be retained until the enemy fleet was in retreat. Contrary to this, the meleeist 
believed that the line could be discarded in order to force out a decision. During the battles 
the Admirals developed three tactical maneuvers. The first of these tactics was merging the 
vessels. Another possibility was a tactical encirclement. Finally, a breakthrough was 
formulated in the instructions which tactics can be found in James, Duke of York's 
Supplementary Instructions in 1672. In the battle the attacking fleet penetrated the enemy 
lines, broke it and divided the enemy's fleet.8 
Both of these schools represented themselves in the Anglo-Dutch Wars. My goal is to 
describe the development of tactics on the basis of the ideas of these two schools. First I 
examine the instructions and then how they were applied in practice. 
After the Peace of Westphalia (1648) new powers emerged in Europe. England, France 
and the Dutch Republic were the great powers. The Netherlands owned its great-power 
status thanks to its economy. The country was at the forefront of long-distance trade. 
Admiral Mahan aptly remarked that "...the Dutch merchantmen (...) caused the grass to 
grow in the streets of Amsterdam.'"9 The year 1650 marked a political turning point in the 
history of the Dutch Republic. The political leadership was in the hands of Johan De Witt 
(1625-1672) who began a more active naval policy at the sea. A commercial rivalry 
envolved between England and the Republic. 
The cause of the first war was the combined effect of several factors. Several works 
emphasize that the main reason was the Navigation Act issued by the English Parliament in 
1651.10 It stipulated that goods could be imported into territories of the English 
Commonwealth only by English ships, or by ships of the country originally producing the 
goods being carried. Some historians, such as Pincus argue that the cause of the outbreak of 
7 Penn's son was William Penn (1644—1718), founder of Pennsylvnia. 
8 Sweetman: Admirálisok, 78-79. 
9 Alfred Thyler Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. Little, Brown and 
company, Boston 1890. 77. 
10 Francis Ludwig Carsten (ed.): The New Cambridge Modem History. Volume. V. The Ascendancy of 
France 1648-1688. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1961. 284.; H. Lawrence Swinburne: 
The Royal Navy. Adam and Charlie Black, London 1907. 61.; Maarten Roy Prak: Hollandia 
aranykora: a Köztársaság talánya. [Gouden Eeuw. Het raadsel van de Republiek] Osiris Kiadó, 
Budapest 2004. 48.; John Leyland: The Royal navy: its influence in English history and in the growth 
of empire. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1914. 42.; Williams Hamilton: Britain's naval 
power: a short history of the growth of the British navy from the earliest times to Trafalgar. 
MacMillan and Co., London 1894. 64. 
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the war was ideological.11 Another cause was the English demand that all ships lower then-
flag in the Channel.12 
In May, 1652 Maarten van Tromp (1598-1653), one of the most prominent sailors of 
the age refused to salute the English vessels. The English opened fire. Tromp lost two ships 
but escorted his convoy to the port.13 Two months later, on July 10, 1652 the English 
Parliament formally declared war on the Dutch Republic.14 The outcome of the battles was 
quite different during the war. The opposing forces were of the same strength. During the 
first month the English ships attacked the dutch merchant ships. Robert Blake (1599-1657), 
who was the "general at sea" of the English navy prevented the Dutch fishing in the North 
Sea and the dutch trade in the Baltic. Sir George Ayscue (1616-1672) was responsible for 
the protection the Channel.15 
The first battle occured off Plymouth on August 26, 1652. Michiel Adriaenszoon De 
Ruyter (1607-1676) who was a Dutch national hero and an admiral with exceptional ability 
defeated Ayscue's weaker fleet. The next battle took place near the mouth of the River 
Thames at Kentish Knock on October 8, 1652. The English Admirals - Blake, Penn and 
Bourne - sank and captured twenty Dutch ships.16 The Dutch reinforced their fleet. This led 
to the Battle of Dungeness (December 10, 1652) and the Battle of Leghorn (March 14, 
1653.) The Dutch won all these battles.17 During the winter of 1652-53, the English 
repaired their ships and strengthend their position. Between on February 28 - March 2, 
1653 in the Battle of Portland the English Admirals - Blake, Deane and Monck - drove the 
Dutch - Tromp, De Ruyter - out of the Channel.18 
Before the Battle of Portland the war was characterized by unorganization. Then the 
Commonwealth's generals at sea, Robert Blake, Richard Dean and George Monck issued 
their instructions "for the better ordering of the fleet in Fighting" on March 29, 1653.19 
These Fighting Instructions aimed at a single line ahead as a battle formation. The third 
article of the Commonwealth Orders ordered: 
"...Then every ship of the said squadron shall endeavour to keep in the line 
with the admiral, or he that commands in chief next unto him, and nearest the 
enemy." 
11 Steven C. A. Pincus: Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign 
Policy, 1650-1668. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996. 
12 Hamilton: Britain's naval power, 62-64. 
13 James Baikie: Pepys at the royal navy. Adam and Charlie Black, London 1913. 32. 
14 Prak: Hollandia aranykora, 48. 
15 Leyland: The Royal navy, 43^44. 
16 Hamilton: Britain's naval power, 64. 
17 http://www.british-civil-wars.co.uk/military/first-anglo-dutch-war-battles.htm 
liIbid 
19 Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 82-88. Commonwealth Orders, 1653. Blake, Monck, Disbrowe and 
Penn re-issued the Commonwealth Orders with some amendments and verbal alterations in March 
1654. (Granville Penn: Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn...: From 
1644 to 1670. Volume II. James Duncan, Paternoster Row, London 1833. 76-80.) 
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The Orders were comprised of fourteen articles. Eight established commands based on 
tactical circumstances (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 13). These instructions regulated the combat 
situations. Before the battle started each unit had to send a ship to detect the enemy fleet 
(Article 1). Article 2 provided that the rear-admiral and the vice-admiral had to come to the 
admiral on each wing when the fleet discovered the enemy. The vice-admiral was on the 
right wing and the rear-admiral was on the left wing. Also the paragraphs try to provided 
what to do if a ship from the fleet was disabled, sinking or burning (Article 4 and 5). The 
articles regulated what to do if the enemy ship was in the English hands (Article 10). 
Article 12 detailed how to prevent and repel the enemy fleet's fireship attack. Article 13 
regulated the attack of the fireship of the fleet. 
Four articles were standing orders. Article 11 was such an article: 
"None shall fire upon any ship of the enemy that is laid aboard by any of our 
own ships, but so that he may be sure he endamage not his friend." 
Two prescribed signals to be made by ships retiring to repair damage or in distress 
(Article 6 and 14). Article 14 formulated what signal should be applied when the fleet was 
in retreat. We can observe that the signal was not a flag signal: 
"...the signal to be firing two guns, the one so nigh the other as the report may 
be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like with two guns 
more." 
Article 6 also regulated what to do in the event when the admiral's ship or any other 
flagship had to leave the battlefield: 
"...the respective squadron are to endeavour to keep up in a line as close as 
they can betwixt him [admiral] and the enemy, having always one eye to 
defend him in case thew enemy should come to annoy him in that condition." 
Article 7 directed that where the windward station was gained the line ahead had to be 
formed "upon severest punishmenf'. The sign for this maneuver was a blue flag at the 
mizen yard or the mizen topmast. Article 8 ordered which signals the ships should be used 
in battle. Article 9 provided similar signals for flagships. 
The Generals at Sea were veteran military men. They all served in the English Civil 
War. Blake was the only one of the three generals who had had experience of naval actions. 
They were accustomed to the much greater control a general could at least aspire to 
exercise in engagements ashore. The new instructions were calculated to bring out the best 
methods which they had empirically practised. His goal was the maintenance of a closed 
system, constant practicing, precise and careful use of weapons, and most importantly 
compliance with the instructions of the commander. 
In the next battle at Gabbard Bank on June 12-13, 1653, thanks to the instructions, the 
commanders used the line formation. The English won an overwhelming victory over the 
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Dutch. "Our fleet," said a report by an eye-witness, "did work together in better order than 
before and seconded on another."20 
The final battle of the war was the Battle of Scheveningen (also known as the Battle of 
Texel or the Battle of Ter Heijde) on August 8-10, 1653. Tromp, De Ruyter and Witte de 
With entered into battle with the English fleet led by Monck. The battle was watched by 
hundreds of spectators on the beaches as the two fleets met in a fierce fight of the line. 
"This is the first action," wrote Paul Hoste, who was the author of the first treatise on Naval 
Tactics21, "that the Dutch fleet forming in single line (...) and they adopted it in English 
formation."21 In the early stages of the battle, Tromp was killed by a musket shot as his 
flagship the Brederode led the Dutch attack. The loss was irreplaceable. A contemporary 
writer aptly remarked, that "If they should cast twenty John Evertsen and twenty De Ruyters 
into-one, they couldn't make one Tromp."13 The new Dutch commanders De With, De 
Ruyter and Jan Evertson retreated from the battle. The Battle of Scheveningen was the last 
fleet engagement before the war ended with the signing of the Peace of Westminster on 
May 8, 1654. 
The material and financial sources of England and the Dutch Republic were exhausted. 
England won the war and the Netherlands was forced to recognize the Navigation Act. 
Thereafter all Dutch vessels were obliged to pay tribute to the English ships in the 
Channel.24 The most serious differences however were not resolved. The two countries' 
commercial rivalry and the struggle between the two navies continued. 
The Dutch Republic quickly recovered from the first Anglo-Dutch War. It was still a 
great power. When the monarchy was restored in England in 1660, Charles II (ruled 1660-
1685) used his full power to put an end to the Dutch commercial superiority. The fight 
broke out in the colonies, and then it spread to Europe. James, the Duke of York instructed 
Robert Holmes (1622-1692) who was at service of the Royal African Company to occupy 
the Dutch colonies and trading posts in West Africa. Parallelly with the events in Africa, 
the English occupied the Dutch possesions in North America.25 The English fleet -
20 Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 79. 
21 Paul Hoste (1652-1700) was a French priest and mathematician. He was present at a number of 
naval engagements including the Battle of La Hougue in 1692. Hoste learned many of his tactical 
ideas from Tourville and it was Tourville's suggestion that he wrote his masterpiece: L'art des armées 
navales (L'art des armées navales : où traité des évolutions navales, qui contient des Règles utiles 
aux officiers généraux, et Particuliers d'une armée navale ; avec des examples tirez de ce qui s'est 
passé de plus considérable sur la mer depuis cinquante ans... Anisson & Posuel, Lyon 1697). Hoste 
was the author of several other works (Receuil des traités mathématiques, 1692). He received a 
pension from Louis XIV, to whom L 'art des armées navales was dedicated. 
22 Hoste: L 'art des armées navales, 78. "Les Anglois avoient essaié de gagner le vent. Mais l'Admirai 
Tromp en aiant toujours conservé l'avatage, & s'étant rangé sur une ligne parallèle à celle des 
Anglois, arriva sur eux, & commença le combat... " Hoste's source was a French eye-witness, who 
stayed on a Corvette on the day of the battle. 
23 Leyland: The Royal navy, 47. 
24 Charles D. Younge: The British Navy, the earliest period to the present. R. Bentley, London 1866. 
76. 
25 George Clark: The Later Stuarts: 1660-1714. 2. ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1955. 63. 
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commanded by Colonel Richard Nicolis (1624-1672) - occupied New Amsterdam which 
Holmes named to New York, in honor of the Duke of York at a later stage of the war.26 
During the Restoration James, the Duke of York was the commander in chief of the 
English fleet. He issued his first tactical instructions to the fleet on April 10, 1665.27 The 
commands essentialy did not include many new instructions compared to the ones in 1653. 
After rising to the throne Charles did not want a collection of commands to remain in 
practice, issued by the Republic, which executed his father. 
There were only two new important provisions among the sixteen articles. Article 2 told 
captains to "put themselves into the place and order which shall have been directed them in 
the order of battle". Article 3 formulated, that the ships "they can to engage with the enemy 
according to the order prescribed'. Thanks to these instructions each ship had now been 
assigned a definite position in the line. 
Later, on April 18 James added ten Additional Instructions to his previous provisions.28 
Article 6 reflects the tactical thinking of James. He thought that the formation should be 
retained until the enemy fleet was in retreat. This instruction made it impossible for any 
unit of the fleet to exploit a tactical situation or a moment of opportunity. 
The directive specified what distance had to observed in the line for the ships. The 
distance was half a cable's lenght (100 yard).29 The Royal Navy (as Charles II entitled it 
following the Restoration) would observe that distance for almost two hundred years.30 
"...the commanders of his majesty's fleet shall endeavour to keep about the 
distance of half a cable's length one from the other..."(Article 4) 
Article 7 formulated what to do when chasing the enemy: 
"In case of chase none of his majesty's fleet or ships shall chase beyond sight 
of the flag, and at night all chasing ships are to return to the flag." 
Only nine days later James issued three additional instructions.31 These instructions 
were the confirmation of his previous instructions. James clearly intended to concentrate 
tactical control of the fleet in his hand. 
The first battle, which almost put an end to the war took place at Lowestoft on June 13, 
1665.32 James broke through the Dutch line and won the battle. It was the most serious 
26 See. Henry L. Schoolcraft: The Capture of New Amsterdam. English Historical Review, Vol. XXII. 
1907. 674-693. 
27 Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 100-104. The Duke of York, April 10, 1665. 
28 Ibid. 104-106. The Duke of York, April 10 or 18,1665. 
29 This distance was a filli cable in the French fleet. Hoste: L'art des armées navales, 65. "Les 
Vaisseaux doivent Etre ά un cable les une des autres, ou à cent toises." 
30 Sweetman: Admirálisok, 20. 
31 Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 106-107. The Duke of York's Supplementary Order, April 27, 
1665. 
32 William Laird Clowes: The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present. Volume. 
II. S. Low, Marston, London 1897. 259-264.; Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power, 67-71. 
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defeat of the Dutch Republic's navy.33 Sir William Penn believed that the battle was fought 
according to the Fighting Instruction which provided the division of the enemy fleet.34 
However, James did not write anywhere that this maneuver was intentional. The victory 
was due to an accident: Opdam's ship, which was the flagship of the Dutch fleet, exploded. 
James was relieved from his post in the leadership of the fleet because he did not press 
the chase of the defeated Dutch fleet. James acted according to his Fighting Instruction. He 
retained the formation: "None of the ships of his majesty's fleet shall pursue any small 
number of ships of the enemy before the main of the enemy's fleet shall be disabled or shall 
run."35 
After James left, Prince Rupert and Monck were appointed the heads of the English 
fleet. De Ruyter who returned to the West Indies led the Dutch fleet. The two opposing 
fleets clashed again on June 11-14, 1666. The Four Days' Battle was one of the longest and 
bloodiest naval engagements of the age.36 
Before the battle started the English fleet was split into two parts because the 
intelligence had reported that the English should also be take up the fight with the French 
fleet.3 In January, 1666 the French monarchy entered the war on the Dutch side. The fleet 
allocation during the battle was a strategic mistake. This mistake was a decisive reason for 
the defeat of the English fleet. 
The battle and the assessment of the battle were very important lessons for the 
development of tactics. First of all we must mention a contemporary criticism about the 
English command. Samuel Pepys consided to his diary that Admiral Sir William Penn had 
told him it proved "...we must fight in line, whereas we fight promiscuously, to our utter 
demonstrable ruin: the Dutch fighting otherwise, and we whenever we beat them."3* His 
assertion should not be accepted without source criticism. He was not present at the battle. 
He knew that the causes of defeat were strategic, not only tactical reasons. Penn was the 
opponent strategic school's representative. And it is hard to believe that the English fleet 
took up the fight without line formation in the middle of the Second Dutch War. Finally, 
Penn was "...the falsest rascal that ever was in the world', according to Sir George Carter, 
who was the treasurer of the fleet.39 
33 Sweetman: Admirálisok, 51. 
34 Penn: Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn, 322-333., 344-350. The 
order which provided breaking the enemy's fleet was not included among the directives in the Second 
Anglo-Dutch War. James issued such instruction in 1672, presumably based on the lessons of the 
previous war. (Corbett: Fighting instructions, 121-122. The Duke of York's Supplementary Orders, 
1672. Article 2.) 
35 Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 104. The Duke of York, April 10 or 18, 1665. Article 6. 
36 See. J. R. Jones: The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century. Longman, London, New 
York. 1996. 169-171.; Frank L. Fox: A Distant Storm: The Four Days ' Battle of 1666: The Greatest 
Sea Fight of the Age of Sail. Press of Sail Publications, Rotherfield 1996. 167-314.; Mahan: The 
Influence of Sea Power, 71-76.; Clowes: The Royal Navy, 264-279. 
37 Clark: Later Stuarts, 65. 
38 Samuel Pepys: The Diary of Samuel Pepys. From 1659 to 1669. Ed. Lord Braybrooke. Frederick 
Warne an Co., London, New York 1879. 219. (July 4, 1666.) 
39 Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 98. 
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De Guiché, the French Count, who joined the Dutch fleet praised the English fleet. He 
remembered the English ships with admiration and using a military analogy, he drew 
parallels with the cavalry: 
"Nothing equals the beautiful order of the English at sea. (...) They fight like 
a line of cavalry which is handled according to rule, and applies itself solely 
to force back those who oppose; whereas the Dutch advance like cavalry 
whose squadrons leave their ranks and come separately to the charge."40 
The English tactics reflected the ideas of the meleeist tactic. We can see it in Prince 
Rupert's instruction: 
"...and to endeavour the utmost that may be the destruction of the enemy, 
which is always to be made the chiefest care."41 
The English fleet broke through the line of the Dutch fleet in the battle. On the fourth 
day - probably due to Rupert's Instruction - Myngs broke through the Dutch line and then 
carried out the attack with his ships on the other side. 
After the lost battle the English military moral did not break up. De Witt perfectly 
realized: "If the English were beaten, their defeat did them more honour than all their 
former victories; all the Dutch had discovered was that Englishmen might be killed and 
English ships burned, but English courage was invincible."'2 
In the next battle, the St. James's Day fight the English won (on August 4-5, 1666).43 
Tromp opened the Dutch line.44 He left the line whith his ships and he began a separate 
battle with the English van. This was the reason for the defeat of the dutch fleet. 5 The 
battle demonstrated - with Dutch example - the correctness of the tactics of the formalists. 
If the commanders do not keep the closed line then the fleet will be defeated. 
On June 20-23, 1667 the Dutch successfully attacked the English naval base at the 
mouth of the River Medway.46 They broke the boom which guarded Chatham harbour, 
40 "...que rien n'égale le bel Orde & la Discipline des Anglois. (...) Il faut imaginer une ligne de 
Cavallerie, qui se gouverne avec Règle; & qui s'applique seulement à faire céder celle qui lui est 
opposée, (...) vers les ennemis [the Dutch]; contre une autre, dont les Escadrons sortiront de leur 
Rang, & avanceront inégalement à la Charge." Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power, 74. Quoted by 
Mémoires d'Armand de Gramont, Comte de Guiche, Concernant les Provinces Unis des Pays-Bas 
servant de supplément et de confirmation à ceux d'Aubrey du Maurier et du Comte d'Estrades. 
Philippe Changuion, Londres 1744. 251., 267. 
41 Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 107-108. Prince Rupert, 1666. Article 1. 
42 Swinburne: The Royal Navy, 91-92. 
43 See. Gijs Rommelse: The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667): Raison d'État, Mercantilism and 
Maritime Strife. Uitgeverij Verloren, Hilversum 2006. 161.; Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power, 76.; 
Sweetman: Admirálisok, 52.; Clowes: The Royal Navy, 278-282. 
44 Cornells Tromp (1629-1691), the son of Maartren Tromp. 
45 Rommelse: The Second Anglo-Dutch War, 161-162. 
46 See. P. G. Rogers: The Dutch in the Medway. Oxford University Press, London, New York 1970.; 
David Douglas (ed.): English Historical Documents. Volume. VI. 1660-1714. Routledge, London 
1996. 835-836.; Rommelse: The Second Anglo-Dutch War, 180-182. 
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burnt four ships of the line, towed away the Royal Charles, the largest vessel of the fleet.47 
This was a great moral victory. In London panic broke out among the inhabitants and the 
political leadership. They were afraid of a Dutch invasion. The diary of Samuel Pepys gives 
a telling account of the events.48 The demand for peace intesified in England.49 
The Treaty of Peace, Alliance, Navigation and Commerce was concluded by Sir Henry 
Coventry and Denzil Hollis from England and Hieronymus Bevemik from Holland, Pieter 
De Huybert from Zeeland and Allard Jongestal from Friesland at the Dutch city of Breda on 
July 31, 1667.50 Surinam (northern South America) and Polaroon or Pulo-Run (the island of 
Rim in Indonesia) remained in Dutch hands. New Amsterdam (New York), New Jersey and 
Daleware were kept by England. The Navigation Laws (1651, 1660) were modified and the 
Dutch were now allowed to ship German goods to England.51 
In the Third Anglo-Dutch War we can see the change in the alliance system, which was 
characteristic of the modern age. The French monarchy aimed to have a continental 
hegemony in Europe. The English and the French monarchy concluded the Dover 
Convention on June 1, 1670. The Convention aimed at breaking the trade hegemony of the 
Dutch Republic. According to the plan they wanted to destroy the Republic's military 
strength at sea and on land and then they wanted to appoint a new political leadership.52 
Louis XIV (ruled 1643-1715) wanted a quick war in alliance with England, Cologne and 
Münster. However, the conflict very quickly reached a continental size. In the first phase of 
the war the English fleet attacked the Dutch ships. The English historians called this 
conflict the Third Anglo-Duch War.53 
At the begining of the war James was re-appointed as Fleet Commander. He was the 
commander of the fleet a short period. In 1672 the Test Act formulated the exclusion of 
non-anglicans from the various offices.54 James was Catholic so he was forced to leave his 
47 Visitors can see the Royal Charles's counter in the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. The Royal Charles's 
counter is the part of the ship which rises up above the stern, and was often decorated with elaborate 
carving. http://www.rijksmuseum.nl/aria/aria_assets/NG-MC-239?page=0&lang=en&context_space= 
&context_id= 
48 Henry B. Wheatley (ed.): The Diary of Samuel Pepys. Volume II. Random House, New York 1951. 
600. For example he wrote this on July 17, 1667: "The Dutch fleete are in great squadrons 
everywhere still about Harwich, and were lately at Portsmouth; and the last letters say at Plymouth, 
and now gone to Dartmouth to destroy our Streights ' fleete lately got in thither; but God knows 
whether they can do it any hurt, or no, but it was pretty news come the other day so fast, of the Dutch 
fleets being in so many places, that Sir W. Batten at table cried, "By God, " says he, "I think the Devil 
shits Dutchmen." 
49 Clark: Later Stuarts, 67-68. 
50 Rommelse: The Second Anglo-Dutch War, 184-188. 
51 George Chalmers: A Collection of Treaties Between Great Britain and Other Powers. Vol. I. 
Printed for J. Stockdale, Piccadilly, London 1790. 132-159.; See. Jonathan Israel: The Dutch 
Republic: It's Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995. 774. Quoted by 
P. J. van Winter: De Acte van Navigatie en de Verde van Breda. In: Bijdragen voor de geschiedenis 
der Nederlanden 4. 1949. 27-65. 
52 Prak: Hollandia aranykora, 52. 
53 Hahner Péter: A régi rend alkonya. Egyetemes történet 1648-1815. Panem, Budapest 2006. 100. 
54 Ibid. 164. 
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office. His naval career came to an end in 1672. Sometime in spring between summer of 
1672 he issued his instructions taking into account the experience of the previous war. The 
documents contained twenty-six articles which repeated and renewed the previous war's 
instructions.55 
After his first instructions James issued three supplementary orders.56 Article 1 reflected 
the English tactical idea. The paragraph ordered to keep the enemy fleet to leeward 
position. The English fleet in the 17—19 century still endeavored to ensure that vessels to 
be placed in windward position. The fleet that was in windward position, had advantages 
over the enemy fleet.57 
The interpretation of Article 2 is problem because the order is not characteristic of the 
tactical thinking of James. This article first laid down in writing to break through and divide 
the enemy's fleet: 
"...if the van of our fleet find that they have the wake of any part of them, 
they are to tack and to stand in, and strive to divide the enemy's body..." 
This tactical maneuver was far from the formalists' tactical idea. This was rather 
characterized the meleeists ' represented by Monck and Prince Rupert. This was an earlier 
instruction probably in the second war which first appeared in written form in 1672. James 
enshrined in this instruction, taking into account the experience of the previous war. 
Finally, Article 3 provided again that the commanders had to keep the line at all costs. 
At this point we see again the tactical thinking of James which reflected formalism·. 
"The several commanders of the fleet are to take special care that they keep 
their line, and upon pain of death that they fire not over any of our own 
ships." 
The first battle between the Allied and the Dutch fleet - commanded by De Ruyter -
was on June 7, 1672. The Dutch took up the fight on the Suffolk coast, in the Solebay.58 
The Anglo-French fleet was defeated and the Netherlands temporarily averted the risk of a 
seaward attack. But in the meantime the French troops penetrated deep into the 
Netherlands. Amsterdam was under a direct threat. In this situation Zeeland recognized 
William III (stadtholder 1672-1702; king of England 1689-1702) as stadtholder. The 
Dutch troops, thanks to William's fast response managed to force Louis's regiments back 
down. 
In 1673 the events were concentrated at sea again. The Dutch encountered the Allies 
three times: twice in Scoonnenveld and once in Texel. The Dutch Admirals won all the 
three battles and repulsed the invasion intention of the Allied fleet.59 Texel was the last 
55 Corbett: Fighting Instructions, 118-120. The Duke of York, 1672. 
56 Ibid. 121-123. The Duke of York's Supplementary Orders, 1672. 
57 John Keegan: A tengeri hadviselés története [The Price of Admiralty. War at Sea from Man-of-War 
to Submarine], Corvina Kiadó, Budapest 1998. 50. 
58 Israel: The Dutch Republic, 797. Quoted by C. R. Boxer: The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th 
Century. National Maritime Museum Booklet, London 1974. 47-48. 
59 Prak: Hollandia aranykora, 55. 
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battle of the Third Anglo-Dutch war. England finished the war against the Republic and 
concluded the Second Peace of Westminster on February 19, 1974.60 Thanks to the peace 
the Netherlands won new allies against the French. The length of the war revealed the 
weaknesses of the French monarchy and a stalemate developed. On August 10, 1678 the 
French and the Dutch concluded the Peace of Nijmegen which meant the end of the war. 
England and the Netherlands were exhausted by the wars which mutually weakened the 
two countries. The English won only the first war by an overwhelming superiority. In the 
Peace of Breda which ended the second war, the English had to make concessions in favor 
of their opponent. However, they acquired the North American colonies. The third war was 
a complete and shameful failure for the English. The French monarchy only used England 
in order to achieve its great-power aspirations. 
The Anglo-Dutch Wars were important not only in terms of the development of the 
relationship between the two countries. Thanks to Blake's instructions the line was adopted 
as the basic order of battle by every European sailing fleet. The typical Medieval impact 
tactics was replaced by the ship-ship, line-line tactics. 
The new tactics brought succès for the English in the first conflict. The second and the 
third wars were characterized by the opposition of the two schools. In the development of 
naval warfare tactics Horatio Nelson's thinking brought a new impetus who undertook the 
risky sea maneuvers - as Monck and Rupert - in order to destroy the entire fleet of the 
enemy. 
60 Chalmers: A Collection of Treaties, 172-174. 
